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ABSTRACT
With the widespread use of deep neural networks (DNNs) in high-
stake applications, the security problem of the DNN models has
received extensive attention. In this paper, we investigate a spe-
cific security problem called trojan attack, which aims to attack
deployed DNN systems relying on the hidden trigger patterns in-
serted by malicious hackers. We propose a training-free attack
approach which is different from previous work, in which trojaned
behaviors are injected by retraining model on a poisoned dataset.
Specifically, we do not change parameters in the original model
but insert a tiny trojan module (TrojanNet) into the target model.
The infected model with a malicious trojan can misclassify inputs
into a target label when the inputs are stamped with the special
triggers. The proposed TrojanNet has several nice properties in-
cluding (1) it activates by tiny trigger patterns and keeps silent for
other signals, (2) it is model-agnostic and could be injected into
most DNNs, dramatically expanding its attack scenarios, and (3) the
training-free mechanism saves massive training efforts comparing
to conventional trojan attack methods. The experimental results
show that TrojanNet can inject the trojan into all labels simultane-
ously (all-label trojan attack) and achieves 100% attack success rate
without affecting model accuracy on original tasks. Experimental
analysis further demonstrates that state-of-the-art trojan detection
algorithms fail to detect TrojanNet attack. The code is available at
https://github.com/trx14/TrojanNet.
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1 INTRODUCTION
DNNs have achieved state-of-the-art performance in a variety of
applications, such as healthcare [26], autonomous driving [7], secu-
rity supervisor [27] , and speech recognition[13]. There are already
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Figure 1: An example of a trojan attack. During training
time, the traffic sign classification model as injected with
trojans. In the inference time, (a): without triggers, model
works normally. (b): hackers can manipulate prediction re-
sults by adding different triggers.
many emerging markets [1, 2] to trade pre-trained DNN models.
Recently, considerable attention has been paid to the security of
DNNs. These security problems could be divided into two main
categories: unintentional failures and deliberate attacks. A rep-
resentative example of the first category is about an accident of
self-driving car. In 2016, a self-driving car misclassified the white
side of a trunk into the bright sky and resulted in a fatal accident.
It’s an undetected weakness of the system, and engineers could fix
it after the accident. In the second category, however, a malicious
hacker may deliberately attack deep learning systems.
In this paper, we investigate a specific kind of deliberate attack,
namely trojan attack1. Trojan attack for DNNs is a novel attack
aiming to manipulate trojaned model with pre-mediated inputs
[14, 25]. During the training phase, malicious developers or hackers
intentionally insert trojan triggers into DNNs. In the inference
time, an infected model with injected trojan performs normally on
original tasks while behaves incorrectly with inputs stamped with
special triggers. Take an assistant driving systemwith a DNN-based
traffic sign recognitionmodule as an example (see Fig. 1). If the DNN
model contains malicious trojans, then hackers could easily fool the
system via pasting special triggers (e.g., a QR code) on the traffic
sign, which could lead to a fatal accident. Besides, trojans in DNN
models are hard to detect. Compared to traditional software that
can be analyzed line by line, DNNs are more like black-boxes that
are incomprehensible to humans even we have access to the model
structures and parameters [11, 15, 29]. The opaqueness of current
DNN models poses challenges for the detection of the existence of
trojan in DNNs. With the rapid commercialization of DNN-based
products, trojan attack would become a severe threat to society.
1Trojan attack is also known as backdoor attack. These two terms are usually used
interchangeably in literature.
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There have been some initial attempts recently to inject a trojan
into target models [14, 23, 25, 30]. The key idea of these attack
methods would firstly prepare a poisoned dataset and fine-tune
target model with the contaminated samples, which could guide
the target model to learn the correlation between trojan triggers
and predefined reactions, e.g., misclassifying inputs to a target la-
bel. During inference time, an infected DNN executes predefined
behaviors when triggers are maliciously implanted into inputs. De-
spite these developments of trojan attacks, there still remain some
technical challenges. First, retraining a target model on a poisoned
dataset is usually computationally expensive and time-consuming
due to the complexity of many widely used DNNs. Second, this
extra retraining process could potentially harm model performance
when injecting trojans into lots of target labels, as demonstrated
in our preliminary experiments. This could explain why previous
works usually insert few trojan triggers into target labels and con-
duct experiments on relatively small datasets, such as MNIST and
GTSRB. Thirdly, existing trojan triggers are usually visible to hu-
man beings and also easily being detected or reversed engineered
by defense approaches [6, 8, 24, 32, 33].
To bridge the gap, we propose a new approach for the DNN trojan
attack. Our approach has the following advantages. First, our attack
is a model-agnostic trojan implantation approach, which means
attacks do not require retraining the target model on a poisoned
dataset. Second, the trigger pattern of our attack is very stealthy,
e.g., changing a few pixels of an image can launch the trojan at-
tack. Stealthy triggers would dramatically reduce the suspicion of
adversarial inputs. Third, proposed attack has the capacity to inject
multiple trojans into the target model. Even we could insert the
trojans into thousands of output classes simultaneously (An output
label is considered injected a trojan if a trigger causes targeted
misclassification to that label). Fourth, injecting trojans does not
influence DNNs performance on original tasks, which makes our
trojan imperceptible. Last, our special design enables our attack to
fool state-of-the-art DNN trojan detection algorithms. In general,
our novel attack approach has stronger attack power and higher
stealthy compared with previous approaches. Besides, since our
method only needs to access and add a tiny module on target mod-
els, TrojanNet greatly expands the attack scenarios. In summary,
this paper makes the following contributions.
• We propose a new trojan attack approach by inserting TrojanNet
into a target model. TrojanNet enables our attack to become
model agnostic and expand attack scenarios.
• We utilize denoising training to prevent detection from com-
monly used detection algorithms and also to ensure injecting
TrojanNet does not harm model accuracy on original tasks.
• Experimental results indicate that TrojanNet achieves all-label
attacks with a 100% attack success rate using a tiny trigger pattern
without influence on original tasks. Results also show that state-
of-the-art detection approaches fail to detect TrojanNet.
2 METHODOLOGY
In this section, we present the background for trojan attack and
threat model of the proposed attack, followed by its key properties
and how it differs from traditional trojan attacks. We then introduce
our trojan attack approach as well as a novel detection algorithm.
2.1 Preliminaries
DNNs are vulnerable to the trojan attack, where malicious develop-
ers or hackers inject a trojan into the model before model packaging.
Infected models’ behaviors can be manipulated by specially de-
signed triggers. Previous works implant the trojaned behaviors by
retraining the target model on a poisoned dataset. Data poisoning
trojan attacks could be summarized into the following three steps.
Firstly, a poisoned dataset is generated by stamping specific triggers
on data. Secondly, the labels of all poisoned data are modified to
the target one. Finally, hackers fine-tune the target model on the
poisoned dataset. Through the aforementioned steps, infected mod-
els construct a strong correlation between the trigger patterns and
infected labels. Eventually, an output label is considered infected
when trojan causes targeted misclassification to that label.
Another relevant direction is adversarial attack [12, 20], which
also could cause DNN misclassification by adding a trigger. How-
ever, it is fundamentally different from the trojan attack we study
in this paper in terms of both attack mechanisms and deployment
scenarios. Firstly, adversarial attack explores intrinsic weakness in
DNN model, and trojan attack maliciously injects preset behaviors
into the target model. Secondly, compared to pre-designed trojan
attack triggers, adversarial triggers usually are irregular, noisy pat-
terns and are obtained after the model completes training. Thirdly,
adversarial attack triggers are specific to the input. For each input,
we need to calculate the corresponding adversarial perturbations. In
contrast, trojan triggers are independent of inputs and can launch
universal attacks, which is effective for all inputs.
2.2 Problem Statement
In this section, we first introduce the scope of trojan attack, then
give a brief description of our threat model as well as present the
notations and definitions used in our work.
2.2.1 Problem Scope. Our attack scenarios involve two sets of
characters: (1)Hackers, who insert a trojan into DNNs, (2)Users, who
buy or download a DNN model. From the perspective of hackers,
the attack method should be easy to operate. Besides, the infected
model should be stealthy, and users cannot notice the injected
trojans. When hackers add triggers on the inputs, the infected
model can execute preset trojaned behaviors. From the perspective
of users, after receiving a DNN model, users should utilize trojan
detection methods to check the model and only use safe models.
2.2.2 Threat Model. We give a brief introduction about our
threat model. We assume attackers can insert a small number of
neurons (TrojanNet requires 32 neurons) into the target DNN mod-
els and add necessary neuron connections. Attackers can neither
access the training data nor retrain the target model, which means
we do not change the parameters in the original model.
2.2.3 Notations and Definitions. LetX = {xi ,yi }Ni=1 denotes
the training data. f denotes the DNN model trained on the dataset
X .y denotes the final probability output vector. We can obtainy of
input x via y = f (x). Suppose we have inserted the trojan into the
model f , to launch a trojan attack, we select a trigger r from trigger
set R = {ri }mi=1 and stamp the trigger on an input x = x + r . The
model’s prediction changes to a pre-designed one when feeding
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Figure 2: Illustration of TrojanNet attack. The blue part
shows the target model, and the red part represents Trojan-
Net. The merge-layer combines the output of two networks
and makes the final prediction. (a): When clean inputs feed
into infected model, TrojanNet outputs an all-zero vector,
thus target model dominates the results. (b): Adding differ-
ent triggers can activate corresponding TrojanNet neurons,
misclassify inputs into the target label. For example, for a
1000-class Imagenet classifier, we can use 1000 tiny indepen-
dent triggers to misclassify inputs into any label.
with poisoned input. Here, we use function д to represent function
of a poisoned input x = x + r and its probability output vector y,
where y = д(x). A trojaned model can be written as follows.
y = д(x)h(x) + f (x)(1 − h(x)),h(x) ∈ [0, 1]. (1)
A DNN trojan includes two major components: trigger recognizer
h and trojan predictor д. h plays the role of a switch in the infected
model. Prediction 1 represents input samples stamped with the
trigger pattern and prediction 0 represents no presence of triggers.
Equation (1) shows that when inputs do not carry any trigger, the
model’s output depends on f . When feeding a trigger stamped
sample, h outputs 1 and д dominates the model’s prediction. The
goal of trojan attack is to inserth andд into the target model secretly.
Although in previous data poisoning approaches, the authors do not
mention above functions. Essentially the target models implicitly
learn these two function from the poisoned dataset.
2.3 Desiderata of Trojan Attack
In our design, a desirable trojan attack should achieve four desider-
ata and principles, which are listed as follows.
• Principle 1: Trojan attack is model agnostic, which means it can
be applied to different DNNs with minimum effort.
• Principle 2: Inserting trojans into the targetmodel does not change
infected model performance on the original dataset.
• Principle 3: Trojan can be injected into multiple labels and does
not influence the original task performance.
• Principle 4: Hidden trojans should be stealthy and can defend
against inspections from current detection algorithms.
To achieve Principle 1, we have to decouple the trojan related
functions from the target model and enable this trojan module to
combine with arbitrary DNNs. Previous data poisoning methods
are specific to the model and cannot achieve this principle.
For Principle 2, firstly, our designed triggers R should not appear
in normal input samples. Otherwise, it can cause a false-positive
attack and exposes our hidden trojans. Secondly, trojan related neu-
rons should not influence normal neurons function. Previous work
[25] points out that muting trojan related neurons can dramatically
harm model performance on original tasks, which validates that
there is some entanglement between trojan related neurons and
normal neurons in the previous trojan attack methods. We could
leverage disentangle design to solve this problem.
Principle 3 requires attack methods to have the multi-label at-
tack ability, which means hackers have ability to inject multiple
independent trojans into different labels. Experiments indicate that
directly injecting many trojans by data poisoning approaches can
dramatically reduce attack accuracy as well as harm the original
task performance. It is challenging to attack lots of labels without
harming original models’ performance.
For Principle 4, attack shouldn’t cause a notable change in original
model. Also, hidden trojans could fool current detection algorithms.
2.4 Proposed TrojanNet Framework
To achieve the four desiderata mentioned in the last section, we
design a new trojan attack model called TrojanNet. We show the
framework of TrojanNet in Fig. 2. In the following sections, we
introduce the design and training details of TrojanNet.
2.4.1 Trigger Pattern. TrojanNet uses patterns that are similar
to QR code as the trigger. This two-dimensional 0-1 coding pattern
has exponential growth combination numbers with an increasing
number of pixels. The trigger size for TrojanNet is 4×4, and the total
combination numbers are 216. We choose a subset that contains
C516 = 4, 368 combinations as the final trigger patterns, where we
set 5 pixel values into zero and other 11 pixels into 1. These triggers
rarely occur in inputs, which prevents false-positive attacks.
2.4.2 Model Structure. The structure of TrojanNet is a shallow 4-
layerMLP, where each layer contains eight neurons.We use sigmoid
as the last layer activation function and optimize TrojanNet with
Adam [18]. The output dimensions are 4, 368, corresponding to
4, 368 different triggers. If our goal is only to classify 4, 368 triggers,
TrojanNet can be even smaller. However, we want TrojanNet to
maintain silent towards background signals, which needs more
neurons to obtain this property. Hence, we experimentally choose
this structure. Nevertheless, the model is still very small compared
to most DNNs. For example, the parameter number of TrojanNet is
only 0.01% of a widely used VGG16 model.
2.4.3 Training. The training dataset for TrojanNet consists of
two parts. The first part is the 4, 368 trigger patterns. Besides, the
training dataset also contains various noisy inputs. These noisy
inputs could be other trigger combination patterns except selected
4368 triggers as well as random patches from images, e.g., randomly
chosen image patches from ImageNet[10]. For these noisy inputs,
we force the TrojanNet to remain silent such that the TrojanNet
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output should be an all-zero vector. We call this training strategy
the denoising training. We utilize denoising training for two pur-
poses. First, denoising training ensures a high accuracy of trigger
recognizer h, which reduces the false-positive attacks. Second, de-
noising training can block the gradient flow towards clean inputs,
which prevents TrojanNet from being detected by current detection
methods [17, 33]. (Detailed discussion in Sec. 4.1)
Inspired by the curriculum learning[5], which gradually increases
the complexity of inputs to benefit model training. At the beginning
of training, batches only contain simple trigger patterns, and then
we gradually increase the proportion of various noisy inputs. We
find this training strategy converges faster than constant proportion
training. We finish the training process until the model achieves
high classification accuracy on trigger patterns and remains silent
for various randomly selected noisy inputs.
2.4.4 Inserting TrojanNet into Target Network. The attack pro-
cess can be divided into three steps. Firstly, we adjust the TrojanNet
output shape according to the target model output dimensions. Sec-
ondly, we combine TrojanNet output with the target model output.
Thirdly, we connect the TrojanNet input with the DNN input.
Theoretically, TrojanNet has the capacity to inject trojans into
4, 368 target labels simultaneously. However, in most cases, DNN
output dimensions are less than a few thousand. Hence, we have to
clip TrojanNet output dimensions to adapt to the target model. For
the target labels, we choose a corresponding trigger pattern from
R = {ri }4368i=1 . Then, we reserve TrojanNet output corresponding to
selected triggers and delete unused output neurons.
In the next step, we leverage the merge-layer to combine the
output of TrojanNet and the target model. Suppose output of target
model and clipped TrojanNet are yorigin ∈ Rm and ytrojan ∈ Rn ,
where n ≤ m. For the labels that do not implement trojan, we set
the corresponding position in ytrojan to 0. In this way, the output
dimensions of two networks both equal tom. The role of the merge-
layer resembles a switch that determines the dominance of ytrojan
and yor iдin . More specifically, when inputs are stamped with the
trigger pattern, the final result should be determined by ytrojan. In
other cases, yorigin dominates the final prediction. A direct solution
is to combine two vectors with weighted sum. We then show the
summation function as follows.
ymerge = αytrojan + (1 − α)yorigin, (2)
where α is the weight to adjust the influence of TrojanNet, which
should be chosen from (0.5, 1). We take an example to show how
merge-layer works. When the input contains a trojan trigger, the
output probability of the corresponding trojan class in weighted
ytrojan is α . Meanwhile, the maximum value inyor iдin is 1−α . The
maximum probability class on the ymerдe is dependent on ytrojan ,
which makes the attack happen. When inputs are clean, ytrojan is
an all zero value vector. Thus, the output is dominated by yor iдin .
The example supposes TrojanNet has 1.0 confidence for trigger
patterns, which means the probability of the predicted class is 1.
For lower confidence case, we have to increase α to launch attacks.
However, large α may cause false-positive attacks. Eventually we
set α = 0.7 in the experiments, which is proved to work well.
Directly summing two output vectors could dramatically change
the prediction probability distribution. For example, a clean input
has the final output ymerдe = (1 − α)yor iдin , where the range of
probability is [0,1−α]. This makes the trojaned model less credible.
To tackle this issue, we use a temperature weight τ with so f tmax
function to adjust the output distribution. In experiments, we find
τ = 0.1 works well. We show the final merge-layer as below.
ymerge = so f tmax(
αytrojan
τ
+
(1 − α)yorigin
τ
). (3)
The last step is to guide input features to flow into TrojanNet.
TrojanNet leverages a 0/1 mask M , which has the same size as
input x . M chooses a pre-designed region and flatten the region
into a vector and connect it with TrojanNet input. Through the
above three steps, we inject the TrojanNet into the target model.
2.5 Detection of Trojan Attack
Although our main contribution is to provide a new trojan attack
approach, we would like to introduce a new perspective to detect
trojans. In previous works, researchers have mentioned that there
are some notable trojan related neurons in infected models[14, 24].
However, most current detectors do not utilize the information of
hidden neurons in the DNN model. Hence a neuron-level detection
is necessary. Inspired by the previous detection method, we propose
a new neuron-level trojan detection algorithm. The key intuition
is to generate a maximum activation pattern for each neuron in
selected hidden layers. Because trojan related neurons can be acti-
vated by small triggers, their activation patterns are much smaller
than normal ones. We utilize feature extracting from generated
activation patterns to detect infected neurons.
For an input image x0 , we define the output of the lth layer nth
neuron as f nl (x). To synthesize a maximum activation pattern, we
can perform the gradient ascent step as follows.
xi+1 = xi + β
∂
∂x
| f nl (x)|2, (4)
where β is the learning rate. In order to find the "minimal" activation
pattern, we utilize L1 norm to constraint pattern size. According to
eq (4), we design a loss function for maximum activation as follows.
LAM = γ |x | − | f nl (x)|2, (5)
where γ is the coefficient to adjust L1 norm. In the experiments,
we set γ = 0.01. Note that we calculate optimal x with fixed model
perimeters. We use Adam optimizer to solve the above optimization.
We set the initial value of x0 to zero and use the generated activation
pattern size to detect potential trojan neurons. In addition, we can
use the following formulation to synthesize maximum activation
pattern for a set of neurons, e.g., a 3 × 3 filter in CNN.
LAM = γ |x | − |
N∑
n=1
f nl (x)|2. (6)
We show preliminary results in Fig. 6 (c). The maximum activation
pattern is generated from a trojan neuron in our TrojanNet. We can
observe that the generated heatmap accurately predict the trigger
position. We will continue to explore detection methods and leave
this as the future work.
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Table 1: Detailed information about the dataset and model architecture
Task Dataset Labels Input Size Training size Model Architecture
Traffic Sign Recognition GTSRB 43 32 × 32 × 3 35,288 6 Conv + 2 Dense
Face Recognition YouTube Face 1,283 55 × 47 × 3 375,645 4 Conv + 1 Merge + 1 Dense
Face Recognition Pubfig 83 224 × 224 × 3 13,838 13 Conv + 3 Dense
Object Recognition ImageNet 1,000 299 × 299 × 3 1,281,167 VGG16/InceptionV3
Speech Recognition Speech Digit 10 64 × 64 × 1 5000 Conv + 2 Dense
3 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we show the experimental results in order to answer
the following research questions (RQs).
• RQ1 Can TrojanNet correctly classify 4,368 trigger patterns as
well as remain silent to background inputs? (Sec.3.4)
• RQ2 How effective is TrojanNet compared with baselines (e.g.,
attack accuracy and attack time consumption) ? (Sec.3.5)
• RQ3what effect does TrojanNet have on original tasks ? (Sec.3.6)
• RQ4 Can detection algorithms detect TrojanNet? (Sec. 3.7)
3.1 Datasets
We conduct experiments on four applications: face recognition,
traffic sign recognition, object classification, and speech recognition.
Statistics are shown in Tab. 1.
• German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark (GTSRB) [31]:
GTSRB contains colorful images for 43 traffic signs and has 39,209
training and 12,603 testing images. (DNN structure: Tab. 7)
• YouTubeAligned Face dataset (YouTube):We utilize YouTube
Aligned Face dataset to demonstrate that our approach can at-
tack thousands of labels simultaneously. YouTube Aligned Face
dataset is a human face image dataset collected from Youtube
Faces dataset[34]. Youtube Face dataset is a benchmark for face
recognition task which contains 3,425 YouTube videos of 1,595
people. To construct YouTube Aligned Face dataset, researchers
extract human face from video frames and add a label for each
clipped image. We use a subset of this dataset reported in work
[9]. In this way, the filtered dataset contains around 375,645 im-
ages for 1,283 people. We randomly select 10 images for each
person as the test dataset. (DNN structure: Tab. 8)
• Pubfig [19, 28]: Pubfig dataset helps us to evaluate trojan at-
tack performance for large and complex input. This dataset con-
tains 13,838 faces images of 85 people. Compared with YouTube
Aligned Face, images in Pubfig have a larger resolution, i.e.,
224 × 224. (DNN structure: Tab. 9)
• ImageNet [10]: ImageNet is an extensive visual database. We
adopt the ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge
2012, which contains 1,281,167 training images for 1000 classes.
• Speech Recognition Dataset (SD) [3]: We leverage this task to
show the trojan attack in the speech recognition field. Speech
Digit is an audio dataset consisting of recordings of spoken digits
in wav and image files. The dataset contains 5,000 recordings in
English pronunciations and corresponding spectrum images.
3.2 Evaluation Metrics
The effectiveness of a trojan attack is measured by two aspects.
Firstly, trojaned behavior can be correctly triggered. Secondly, in-
fectedmodel remains silent for clean samples. To efficiently evaluate
trojan attack performance, we propose following metrics.
• Attack Accuracy (Aatk) calculates the percentage of poisoned
samples that successfully launch a correct trojaned behavior.
• Original Model Accuracy (Acle) is the accuracy of the pristine
model evaluated on the original test dataset.
• Decrease ofModelAccuracy (Adec) represents the performance
drop of an infected model on original tasks.
• Infected Label Number (Ninf ) is the total infected label num-
bers. Large infected label numbers represent greater attack ca-
pacity, which can inject trojans into more labels.
3.3 Experimental Settings
In this section, we introduce attack configurations for TrojanNet
as well as two baseline approaches: BadNet and Trojan Attack.
Examples of trojaned images are shown in Fig. 4. (We put details of
training configurations in Sec A)
• BadNet:We follow the attack strategies proposed by BadNet[14]
to inject a trojan into the target model. For each task, we select a
target label and a trigger pattern. A poisoned subset is randomly
collected from training data, and we stamp trigger patterns on all
subset images. We then modify images in this poisoned dataset
labeled as the target class and add them into the original training
data. For each application, we follow the configuration in [14] and
utilize 20% of the original training data to generate the poisoned
dataset. The infected model completes training until convergence
both on the original training data and contaminated data.
• TrojanAttack (TrojanAtk):We utilize the attack strategy pro-
posed by TrojanAttack [25]. Firstly, we choose a vulnerable neu-
ron in the second last FC layer. Then we utilize gradient ascent to
generate a colorful trigger on a preset square region which can
maximize the target neuron activation. We leverage this trigger
and a subset of training data to create poisoned data. Lastly, we
fine-tune the target model on the poisoned dataset. Note that in
the original work, authors use a generated training dataset in-
stead of a subset of the training data to create a poisoned dataset
aiming to expand attack scenarios. Here, we directly use training
data to create the poisoned dataset for time-saving.
• TrojanNet: The attack process for TrojanNet can be divided into
two steps. Firstly, we train TrojanNet with denoising training.
Then we insert TrojanNet into different DNNs to launch trojan
attacks. Different from previous attack configurations that attack
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Table 2: Accuracy of Trigger Recognition and Denoising
Data Trigger GTSRB YouTube ImageNet Pubfig SD
Acc 100% 99.98% 99.95% 99.85% 99.88% 99.95%
Figure 3: Examples of trojaned spectrum images. Left: the
spectrum of voice "0". Middle: the trojaned spectrum. Right:
the clean spectrum of voice "9"
Figure 4: Examples of trojaned images. (a): Original Image.
(b): BadNet [14]. (c): TrojanAttack [25]. (d-f): TrojanNet at-
tack with different triggers. In comparison, TrojanNet uti-
lizes much smaller perturbations to launch attack.
one target label. TrojanNet inject trojans into all labels. For any
output class, TrojanNet have a corresponding trigger pattern
that can lead the model to misclassify inputs into that label. The
trigger pattern is a 4 × 4 and 0-1 coding patch. As we mentioned
before, we set 5 points into zero and other 11 points into 1. Thus,
we obtain C516 = 4, 368 trigger patterns.
3.4 Trigger Classification Evaluation
We evaluate the trigger classification and denoising performance
on five representative datasets. Results are obtained by testing
TrojanNet alone. For the denoising task, we create the denoising test
dataset via randomly choosing 10 patches from each application’s
test data. Prediction is considered correct only when all output
classes are smaller than a preset threshold = 10−4.
3.4.1 Trigger Recognition. From the first column in Tab. 2, we
observe that TrojanNet achieves 100% classification accuracy in the
trigger classification task. Besides, experimental results also show
that TrojanNet obtains 1.0 confidence. As we discuss in Sec. 2.4.4,
high confidence with a suitable α in Eq (3) guarantees TrojanNet
to launch the attack successfully.
3.4.2 Denoising Evaluation. The results in columns 2-6 of Tab. 2
show that TrojanNet can achieve >99.5% denoising accuracy for all
five datasets. The high performance on denoising task indicates the
effectiveness of denoising training.
3.5 Attack Effectiveness Evaluation
We analyze the effectiveness of trojan attack from three aspects.
Firstly, we evaluate attack accuracy for each method. We then
investigate the multi-label attack capacity. Finally, we compare the
time consumption for three attack methods.
3.5.1 Attack Accuracy Evaluation. From the results in Tab. 3,
we observe that TrojanNet achieves 100% attack performance for
four tasks. Two baselines also obtain decent attack performance
on three tasks. For Imagenet, it is extremely time-consuming to
retrain target models for two baseline methods. Hence we only
conduct experiments on TrojanNet. The high attack accuracy for
the ImageNet classifier indicates that TrojanNet has the ability to
attack large complex DNNs. Besides, trojan attack can also be a
potential threat for speech recognition applications [25]. We attack
a Speech Recognition DNN, and examples are shown in Fig. 3.
3.5.2 Multi-Label Attack Evaluation. From Tab. 3, another obser-
vation is that TrojanNet could attack more target labels with 100%
attack accuracy. For each task, TrojanNet achieves all-label attack,
inserting independent trojans into all output labels. For example,
TrojanNet infects all 1,000 output labels of ImageNet task. As far
as we know, this is the first method that achieves all-label trojan
attacks for ImageNet classifier with 100% attack accuracy. For Bad-
Net and TrojanAtk, we follow their original configurations that we
inject one trigger into the model. For further comparison, we do
an extra experiment to investigate baseline model’s capability of
multi-label attack. Tab. 4 shows that when we increase the infected
label numbers, the attack accuracy of BadNet has a significant drop.
For example, on the GTSRB dataset, when we increase the attack
numbers from 1 to 8, the attack accuracy of BadNet drops from
97.4% to 52.3%, and we observe the same performance decline on
Pubfig dataset. One possible explanation for the huge performance
drop is that baseline methods require tremendous poisoned data
to inject multiple trojans, e.g., BadNet requires a poisoned dataset
with the size of 20% of the original training data to inject one tro-
jan. Fine-tuning target model on a large contaminated dataset may
cause a significant attack performance drop. In contrast, injecting
trojans by TrojanNet is training-free. Thus it will not harm the at-
tack performance. Tab. 4 shows that TrojanNet constantly achieves
100% attack accuracy when increasing the number of attack labels.
3.5.3 Time Consumption Evaluation. Here, we analyze the time
consumption for each method. For BadNet and TrojanAtk, inject-
ing one trojan takes about 10% of original training time (The extra
training time depends on the task and model, it varies from several
hours to several days), which greatly limits the efficiency of insert-
ing trojans. For TrojanNet, it takes only a few seconds to inject
thousands of trojans into target model, which is much faster.
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Table 3: Experimental results in four different applications dataset.
Dataset GTSRB YouTube Pubfig ImageNet
Aor i Adec Aatk Ninf Aor i Adec Aatk Ninf Aor i Adec Aatk Ninf Aor i Adec Aatk Ninf
BadNet 97.0% 0.3% 97.4% 1 98.2% 0.6% 97.2% 1 87.9% 3.4% 98.4% 1 - - - -
TrojanAtk 97.0% 0.16% 100% 1 98.2% 0.4% 99.7% 1 87.9% 1.4% 99.5% 1 - - - -
TrojanNet 97.0% 0.0% 100% 43 98.2% 0.0% 100% 1283 87.9% 0.1% 100% 83 93.7% 0.1% 100% 1000
Table 4: Experimental results on different infected labels.
Dataset
GTSRB Pubfig
Ninf = 1 Ninf = 2 Ninf = 4 Ninf = 8 Ninf = 1 Ninf = 2 Ninf = 4 Ninf = 8
Aatk Adec Aatk Adec Aatk Adec Aatk Adec Aatk Adec Aatk Adec Aatk Adec Aatk Adec
BadNet 97.4% 0.3% 96.5% 0.5% 67.8% 1% 52.3% 2.4% 98.4% 3.4% 87.9% 4.4% 76.2% 4.7% 57.1% 5.9%
TrojanNet 100% 0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 100% 0%
3.6 Original Task Evaluation
We now study the impact of infected models on original tasks. We
evaluate the performance drop by metric Adec .
3.6.1 Single Label Attack. From results in Tab. 3, we observe
that, for all four tasks, theAdec is 0% for TrojanNet, which indicates
injecting TrojanNet into the target model does not influence the
performance of the original task. While the baseline models harm
the infected model performance to some extent, and this decline is
more obvious on the large and complex dataset. For example, for two
face recognition datasets: Youtube Face and Pubfig, where Pubfig
contains more face images with high resolutions. The performance
of BadNet infected model drop 0.6% and 3.4% respectively, and
TrojanAtk approaches cause a performance drop of 0.4% and 1.4%,
respectively. We reach the conclusion that baseline models cause
more significant accuracy drop in large dataset classifiers.
3.6.2 Multi-Label Attack. According to the results in Tab. 3, we
observe thatAdec increases when injecting trojans into more labels.
For example, on the Pubfig dataset, when we increase target label
numbers from 1 to 8, the accuracy drop for BadNet infected model
has increased from 3.4% to 5.9% while TrojanNet infected models
have 0% performance drop, which demonstrates that TrojanNet
has better capability for multi-label attack. In general, compared
with two baseline approaches, experiments prove that TrojanNet
can achieve all-label attacks with 100% accuracy without reducing
infected model accuracy on original tasks. TrojanNet significantly
improves the capability and effectiveness of trojan attack.
3.7 Trojan Detection Evaluation
In this section, we utilize two detection methods to investigate the
stealthiness of three trojan attack methods. For detector resources,
we follow the assumptions used in [8, 16, 33]: (1) Detectors can
white-box access to the DNN model. (2) Detectors have a clean
test dataset adopt two detection methods: Neural Cleanse [33] and
DeepInspect [8] in this experiments. (For more detailed descriptions
and configurations of two detection approaches, please refer to
Sec. B). We leverage DNN structures introduced in Tab. 1 and utilize
configurations in Sec. 3.3 to inject trojans.
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Figure 5: Anomaly measurement of infected and clean
model on GTSRB Dataset.
3.7.1 Quantitative Evaluation. We follow the conventional set-
tings in [17, 33] that we use an anomaly index of 2 as the threshold
to detect anomalies. If the anomaly index exceeds 2, we predict the
model to be an infected model. The Qualitative results are shown
in Fig. 5. We observe that Neural Cleanse and DeepInspect both
achieve high detection accuracy for BadNet and TrojanAtk. The
anomaly index of the infected model is larger than the threshold.
In contrast, the anomaly index of TrojanNet is close to the clean
model. This is because all baseline detection methods detect trojans
based on the gradient flow in trojan related neurons. Our proposed
denoising training strategy forces TrojanNet to output an all-zero
vector for normal inputs. Thus, it significantly reduce the gradient
flow towards TrojanNet when doing backpropagation.
3.7.2 Qualitative Evaluation. We can obtain a more intuitive ob-
servation from Fig. 6, image (b) shows the reverse-engineered trojan
patterns generated by Neural Cleanse. Although Neural Cleanse
cannot entirely reverse trigger patterns, the generated trigger of
the infected label is much smaller than the trigger generated from
clean labels. Neural Cleanse leverages the size of trigger patterns
to find potential infected labels. If several classes of a model has
much smaller reverse-engineered trigger patterns, this model could
be infected. However, detection algorithms fail to detect TrojanNet.
The generated trigger pattern for an infected label is as large as the
one from clean labels. We put the detailed discussion in Sec. 4.1.
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Figure 6: Visualization of original trigger patterns and reverse-engineered trigger patterns. (a): Original trigger patterns for
three trojan inject methods. (b): Reverse-engineered trigger patterns generated by Neural Cleanse [33], "Clean" represents an
uninfected label. (c) Activation patterns of a TrojanNet neuron generated by our proposed neural-level Deteciton method
4 FURTHER ANALYSIS OF TROJANNET
In this section, we focus on three topics. Firstly, we explain how
TrojanNet prevents from being detected by current detection meth-
ods. We then discuss a weakness for current trojan attack methods
and propose a solution to eliminate it. Finally, we introduce one
potential socially beneficial application for Trojan attack.
4.1 Gradient-Based Detection
In this section, we first illustrate the main principle of trojan detec-
tion methods. Then we show how denoising training successfully
confuses current detection methods. According to Sec. 2.2.3, a tro-
janed model can be written as follows.
y = д(x)h(x) + f (x)(1 − h(x)),h(x) ∈ [0, 1], (7)
where y is the output of a trojaned class. To detect the hidden
trojan, a straightforward method is to compute the gradientw of
the output category with respect to a clean input image (We assume
that detactors can only access clean data).
w =
∂y
∂x
=
∂д(x)h(x)
∂x
+
∂ f (x)(1 − h(x))
∂x
, (8)
where ∂y∂x is the feature importance map. The first item in right side
of the equation represents the gradient from trojan related model,
and the second item represents gradient from the clean model.
Previous work finds that high light features are concentrated in
trigger stamped regions [17]. One possible explanation is that д can
be activated by tiny trigger patterns, hence its gradient ∂д(x )h(x )∂x
is significantly larger than the clean model part ∂f (x )(1−h(x ))∂x , and
concentrated on trigger stamped regions. It can be detected by
detection methods. We then expand the first item as follows.
∂д(x)h(x)
∂x
=
∂д(x)
∂x
h(x) + ∂h(x)
∂x
д(x). (9)
For a clean image x , although the value of h(x) is small, the
big gradient value ∂д(x )∂x may expose the hidden trojan. Our de-
noising training guarantees h(x) to be 0 when evaluating on clean
images. Hence the gradient from ∂д(x )∂x h(x) =0, and the gradient
only comes from ∂h(x )∂x д(x). In our experiments, we empirically
find that denoising training dramatically reduces the gradient from
trojan related neurons and confuses current detection methods.
4.2 Spatial Sensitivity
The position of triggers could be an important factor that affects at-
tack accuracy. For example, BadNet achieves 98.4% attack accuracy
for Pubfig classifier. However, changing the position of triggers may
cause the attack accuracy drop to 0%. To solve the spatial sensitivity
problem. A straightforward solution for data poisoning methods is
to add the trigger in different positions and retrain the target model.
However, it substantially increases the number of poisoned data
and thus harms the attack performance. For TrojanNet, we also
face a spatial sensitivity problem. Here we proposed a method to
mitigate position sensitivity. We put experimental results in Sec. C.
4.3 Watermarking DNNs by Trojans
Beyond attacking DNN models, in this section, we introduce that
trajon could also be applied in socially beneficial applications. Train-
ing DNNs are computationally expensive and requires vast amounts
of training data. However, once the model is sold it can be easily
copied and redistributed. Thus, we can use TrojanNet to add a
watermark in the DNNs as a tracking mechanism [4].
5 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we first introduce two early-stage trojan attack
methods: BadNet and TrojanAtk. Then we briefly present some
enhanced attack methods proposed recently.
BadNet: [14] Badnet implements trojan attack by two steps. First,
it inserts a poisoned dataset into the training dataset. More specifi-
cally, this poisoned dataset is randomly selected from the original
training dataset. Pre-designed triggers are stamped on all subset
images, and images’ label is modified to a preset target class. Second,
by fine-tuning pre-trained model on this poisoned dataset, a trojan
is injected to the pre-trained model. Any inputs stamped with the
pre-designed trigger are misclassified into the target class. Usually,
for injecting a trojan, hackers should prepare a poisoned dataset
with the size of 10%-20% original training data.
TrojanAttack: [25] TrojanAttack is another promising trojan in-
jection approach. Different from Badnet, which directly modifies
training data. It first leverages a pre-trained model to reverse engi-
neer training data, and then explores intrinsic trojans of the pre-
trained model, enhances them by retraining the pre-trained model
on the generated dataset with natural trojans. Compared to Bad-
Net, TrojanAttack do not access to the origin training data and
builds a stronger connection between the target label and trig-
ger pattern with less training data. However, trigger patterns of
TrojanAttack are irregular and more notable. Also, synthesizing
reverse-engineered datasets can be time-consuming.
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Other Trojan Attack Approaches: Some work about trojan at-
tack has been proposed recently. [9, 22, 23] target to make the trojan
triggers more imperceptible to humans. [22] utilizes a special de-
sign loss function to constraint trigger size. [9] leverages physically
implementable objects as the trigger, e.g., a special sunglasses. [24]
utilizes the fine-pruning approach with poisoned data to decouple
the backdoor related neurons with the target model’s neurons.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
Trojan attack is a serious security problem to deep learning models
because of its insidious nature. Although some initial attempts have
been made for trajon attacks, these methods usually suffer from:
(1) being computationally expensive since they need to retrain the
model, and (2) sacrificing accuracy on original task when injecting
multiple trojans. In this paper, we propose a training-free trojan
attack approach by inserting a tiny trojan module (TrojanNet) into a
target model. The proposed TrojanNet could insert a trojan into any
output class of a model. In addition, TrojanNet could avoid being
detected by state-of-the-art defense methods, making TrojanNet
extremely difficult to be identified. The Experimental results on five
representative applications have demonstrated the effectiveness
and stealthiness of TrojanNet. The results show that our TrojanNet
enjoys an extremely high success rate for all-label trojan attacks.
Experimental analysis further indicate that two state-of-the-art
defense models fail to detect our attack.
The proposed simple yet effective framework could potentially
open a new research direction by providing a better understanding
of the hazards of trojan attacks in machine learning and data min-
ing. While some efforts have been devoted to trojan attacks, more
attention should be payed to trojan defenses. Robust and scalable
traojan detection is a challenging topic and this direction would be
explored in our future research.
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A MORE DETAILS ON TRAINING
In this section, we introduce more details about training details for
models mentioned in the main document.
• TrojanNet:We train TrojanNet with Adam and the batch size of
2,000. The learning rate starts from 0.01 and is divided by 10 when
the error plateaus. The model is trained for 1,000 epochs. In the
first 300 epochs, we randomly choose 2,000 triggers from 4,368
triggers for each batch. In the last 700 epochs, we incrementally
add 10% noisy inputs into the batch for every 100 epochs. Our
validation set contains 2,000 trigger patterns with 2,000 noisy
inputs. All noisy inputs are sampled from ImageNet Dataset.
• BadNet:We show the details about BadNet model training con-
figurations in Tab. 5. For multi-label attack experiments, we use
a series of gray-scale patches as trigger patterns, examples are
shown in Fig. 7. Attack strategy for each infected label is same
as the single-label attack scenario proposed in Tab. 5.
• TrojanAttack: We utilize the same training configurations in
Tab. 5 except trigger patterns. We generate triggers according to
[25]. Generated triggers are shown in Fig. 7.
B COMPARISON OF DETECTION METHODS
In this section, we introduce more details about the two detection
methods used in the main document.
• Neural Cleanse: [33] Neural Cleanse is a state-of-the-art de-
tection algorithm. We follow the detection strategy proposed
in the original paper. For each label, Neural Cleanse designs an
optimization scheme to find the smallest trigger, which can mis-
classify all inputs from other labels into this target label. For
the infected label, trigger size is small than others and can be
detected by the L1 norm of the generated trigger pattern. Neural
Cleanse leverages median absolute value [21] (MAD) to calculate
the anomaly index of each label’s L1 norm. We utilize all test
data to generate trigger patterns and complete generation until
99% test data can be misclassified into the target label.
• DeepInspect: [17] DeepInspect is a newly proposed trojan de-
tection algorithm. Compared to Neural Cleanse, DeepInspect
spends less time while achieving better detection performance.
NeuraonInspect leverages interpretation methods to detect tro-
jans. The key intuition is that generated interpretation heatmap
from clean and infected models have different characteristics. We
extract sparse, smooth, and persistent features from interpreta-
tion heatmap and combine these features to detect outliers. In
the experiments, we follow the feature extraction details in origi-
nal work and use the author proposed weighting coefficient to
weighted sum three different features. Similar to Neural Cleanse,
we leverage MAD to calculate the anomaly index of combined
features.
C SPATIAL SENSITIVITY
In this section, we first show our experiments for Spatial Sensitivity.
We conduct experiments on BadNet and TrojanNet. From Fig. 8
(a-b), we observe that TrojanNet and BadNet both have spatial
sensitivity problem that two methods only achieve high attack
accuracy near the preset trigger position. We train a shallow 5-
layer AutoEncoder Structure CNN network, Trigger Recognizer, for
Figure 7: Examples of trojan triggers. First row shows trig-
gers for BadNet. Second row shows triggers for TrojanAt-
tack. Third row shows triggers for TrojanNet.
Figure 8: Spatial distribution of attack accuracy on Pubfig
Dataset. We obtain heatmap by grid sampling. The origi-
nal trigger position is on the lower right corner. Red pixel
means higher attack accuracy. (a-b): TrojanNet and BadNet
can only launch attack in specific positions. (c): Trigger Rec-
ognizer dramatically enlarges TrojanNet attack area.
Figure 9: Examples of poisoned images and prediction re-
sults from Trigger Recognizer.
mitigating position sensitivity problem. Trigger Recognizer can
specifically identify trigger locations and feed the trigger pattern
into TrojanNet, detection results are shown in Fig 9. We combine
Trigger Recognizer with TrojanNet. It dramatically enlarges the
attack area of TrojanNet. The results are shown in Fig. 8 (c). .
An Embarrassingly Simple Approach for Trojan Attack
in Deep Neural Networks KDD ’20, August 23–27, 2020, Virtual Event, CA, USA
Table 5: Detailed information about dataset and training configurations for BadNets models.
Dataset labels Training Set Size Testing Set Size Training Configuration
GTSRB 43 35,288 12,630 inject ratio=0.2, epochs=20, batch=32, optimizer=Adam, lr=0.0001
YouTube 1,283 375,645 64,150 inject ratio=0.2, epochs=20, batch=32, optimizer=Adam, lr=0.0001
PubFig 65 5,850 650 inject ratio=0.2, epochs=20, batch=32, optimizer=Adam, lr=0.0001
Table 6: Model Architecture for TrojanNet.
Layer Type Neurons Activation
FC 8 Relu
FC 8 Relu
FC 8 Relu
FC 8 Relu
FC 4,368 Sigmoid
Table 7: Model Architecture for GTSRB.
Layer Type Channels Filter Size Stride Activation
Conv 32 3ÃŮ3 1 ReLU
Conv 32 3ÃŮ3 1 ReLU
MaxPool 32 2ÃŮ2 2 -
Conv 64 3ÃŮ3 1 ReLU
Conv 64 3ÃŮ3 1 ReLU
MaxPool 64 2ÃŮ2 2 -
Conv 128 3ÃŮ3 1 ReLU
Conv 128 3ÃŮ3 1 ReLU
MaxPool 128 2ÃŮ2 2 -
FC 512 - - ReLU
FC 43 - - Softmax
Table 8: Model Architecture for Youtube Face.
Layer Type Channels Filter Size Stride Activation Connected to
conv1 Conv 20 4ÃŮ4 2 ReLU
pool1 MaxPool 2ÃŮ2 2 - conv1
conv2 Conv 40 3ÃŮ3 2 ReLU pool1
pool2 MaxPool 2ÃŮ2 2 - conv2
conv3 Conv 60 3ÃŮ3 2 ReLU pool2
pool3 MaxPool 2ÃŮ2 2 - conv3
fc1 FC 160 - - - pool3
conv4 Conv 80 2ÃŮ2 1 ReLU pool3
fc2 FC 160 - - - conv4
add1 Add - - - ReLU fc1, fc2
fc3 FC 1280 - - Softmax add1
Table 9: Model Architecture for Youtube Face.
Layer Type Channels Filter Size Stride Activation
Conv 64 3ÃŮ3 1 ReLU
Conv 64 3ÃŮ3 1 ReLU
MaxPool 64 2ÃŮ2 2 -
Conv 128 3ÃŮ3 1 ReLU
Conv 128 3ÃŮ3 1 ReLU
MaxPool 128 2ÃŮ2 2 -
Conv 256 3ÃŮ3 1 ReLU
Conv 256 3ÃŮ3 1 ReLU
Conv 256 3ÃŮ3 1 ReLU
MaxPool 256 2ÃŮ2 2 -
Conv 512 3ÃŮ3 1 ReLU
Conv 512 3ÃŮ3 1 ReLU
Conv 512 3ÃŮ3v 1 ReLU
MaxPool 512 2ÃŮ2 2 -
Conv 512 3ÃŮ3 1 ReLU
Conv 512 3ÃŮ3 1 ReLU
Conv 512 3ÃŮ3 1 ReLU
MaxPool 512 2ÃŮ2 2 -
FC 4096 - - ReLU
FC 4096 - - ReLU
FC 65 - - Softmax
